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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of number of independent directors, split role of independent directors, board 
meeting and female directors on firm performance in KSE. The study measure the ROA on firm performance. 
Because agency theory suggests that companies with better corporate governance standards perform better. The 
study proposes that better governed KSE firms would have greater performance and higher valuation. The study 
finds that our composite measure of corporate governance is positively and significantly associated with firm 
performance and valuation. These findings have implications for policy makers, researchers, managers, and 
investors in general and those in emerging markets in particular. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Independent Directors 
Board freedom implies that the extent of autonomous independent directors in respect to the aggregate number 
of executives. (John and Senbet 1998) specified that sheets of executives are more autonomous as the extent of 
their outsider director’s increments. Since the directorate is the most essential gadget to screen the administration, 
independency of board individuals turn into a huge issue (Nahar Abdullah 2004). The examination (Fauziah, 
Khairunnisa et al. 2009) contended that sheets with the more independent directors will control the conduct of 
administrators and secure the shareholders interest. 
(Dehaene, De Vuyst et al. 2001) and the examination of (Dahya and McConnell 2003) found a huge 
positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and ROE among Belgian organizations. 
Besides, (Baysinger and Butler 1985) and Rosenstein and (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990), (Brickley, Coles et al. 
1994) locate the same results that positive connection between the extent of outsider directors and the share 
trading system response to toxic substance pill appropriations. Be that as it may, (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991) 
discover no relationship between board creation and execution (utilizing Tobin's Q as the execution measure). 
Then again, (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996) study the interrelationships among seven corporate administration 
systems and locate a negative relationship between board autonomy and firm execution (as measured by Tobin's 
Q). All studies like, (Bhagat and Black 2002), (Bhagat and Bolton 2008) additionally express that organizations 
with more autonomous individuals don't perform better, utilizing diverse execution measures. 
H1: There is a relationship between Independent Directors and Firm performance. 
 
1.2 Split Role of Directors 
(Brickley, Coles et al. 1997) study 661 U.S. firms in the 1989 Forbes remuneration study and find that 
organizations with independent authority don't perform better. Undoubtedly, they infer that duality firms are 
connected with better bookkeeping execution.  
(Krause and Semadeni 2013) study three sorts of bundle: understudy (the past Manager seat surrenders 
the President title yet holds the COB title), flight (firms supplant the President seat with two unmistakable 
people), and minimization (firms strip the President seat of the COB title). They watch that each of the three 
sorts of package upgrade future firm execution if current execution is poor, paying little heed to the way that the 
restrictive impact is just certainly key for student and scale down divisions. 
Arguments regarding the costs and benefits of dual leadership 
The disputes against twofold organization (or for discrete activity) are by and large in perspective of the 
workplace speculation. Presidents of current associations have decision rights yet not control rights over 
shareholder capital. Consequently, Presidents have conflicting leisure activities and don't for the most part act to 
increase shareholder regard. The overseeing body is the summit of the decision control course of action of front 
line corporations, which mitigates association issues as a result of the unit of ownership and control (Fama and 
Jensen 1983). Having director lead this decision controls hierarchy of leadership likely deals the sufficiency of 
the control structure and epitomizes a conclusive beyond reconciliation circumstance. Since picking up and 
transmitting firm-specific information can be over the top, twofold activity potentially acknowledges 
considerable cost reserves by wiping out information trading and get ready costs associated with non-Boss 
overseers. 
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Concrete control in like manner gives clarity as to the activity and direction of the firm, which 
progresses practical overseeing external social events (Dalton, Daily et al. 1998). (Dahya, Dimitrov et al. 2009) 
test whether firm execution enhanced after the division. They neglect to discover any execution change. 
Subsequent to finishing a meta-investigation of 31 studies, (Dalton, Daily et al. 1998) infer that directors duality 
does not influence execution and firm size does not direct the duality–performance connection. Upon isolated 
audits of the writing, (Dalton and Dalton 2011) and (Krause, Semadeni et al. 2014) reason that the writing needs 
confirmation of a substantive connection between firm execution and the board administration structure.  
H2: There is a relationship between split role of directors and Firm performance. 
 
1.3 Board Meeting 
The relationship between board meeting and firm performance is not clear. In any case, there are costs associated 
with burden up social affairs, including authoritative time, travel expenses, and board meeting charges. There are 
also points of interest, including more open door for boss to present, set methodology, and screen organization. If 
associations have less official social events than are basic, overemphasizing costs, official meeting repeat will be 
distinctly associated with firm regard. Evidence in this bearing would recommend that extending meeting repeat 
is one really unobtrusive way for firms to construct regard. If, by separation, points of interest are 
overemphasized, official meeting repeat will be conversely related with firm image. Finally, if a firm is sensibly 
viable in setting the repeat of its official social affairs, dependent upon its surroundings, it will accomplish 
economies in office costs. For such a value boosting firm, the net effect of a negligible change in official meeting 
repeat on firm performance should be close to zero. In total, the relationship between board activity and firm 
performance is a definite demand. 
H3: There is a relationship between board meeting and Firm performance. 
 
1.4 Female Directors 
These days’ researchers are focusing on the board gender differences issue. The female directors’ vicinity has 
expanded numerous folds in the substantial firms. Sadly the same couldn't be reflected in the official sheets. 
Then again their vicinity on directorate is connected with negative firm administration and execution. There has 
been significantly a study on the issue these days and numerous nations like United States and European Union 
require exposure in board enlistment and there has been a portion in Norway. Despite the fact that there has been 
substantially more accentuation on the issue there has been less proof of the female directors effect on firm 
execution.  
 
1.5 Female Directors and Firm Performance 
(Nakagawa and Schreiber 2014) suggested that a firm would see enhanced money related execution by 
expanding the extent of ladies administrators, past studies on the issue, in Japan and somewhere else, have 
demonstrated different results. (Post and Byron 2014) Nevertheless a substantial group of writing inspecting the 
relationship between ladies on sheets and firm budgetary execution, the proof is mixed. To accommodate the 
clashing results, the study factually consolidated the outcomes from 140 studies and look at whether these 
outcomes fluctuate by firms' lawful/administrative and socio-social connections. Study find that female board 
representation is emphatically identified with accounting returns and that this relationship is more positive in 
nations with more grounded shareholder securities maybe in light of the fact that shareholder insurances propel 
sheets to utilize the diverse information, experience, and values that every part brings. study additionally find 
that, despite the fact that the relationship between female board representation and business sector execution is 
close to zero the relationship is sure in nations with more prominent gender equality (and negative in nations 
with low gender equality).  
(Leung, Richardson et al. 2014) analysed whether the relationship between corporate board and board 
council independence and firm execution is directed by the centralization of family proprietorship. Taking into 
account a specimen of Hong Kong firms, the study found no critical relationship between the autonomy of 
corporate sheets or board advisory groups and firm execution in family firms, while board freedom is absolutely 
connected with firm execution in non-family firms. Moreover, studies on discoveries demonstrate that the extent 
of independent executives on the corporate sheets of family firms is lower than that of non-family firms; 
however study found no huge distinction in the representation of independent directors on the key advisory 
groups of corporate sheets in the middle of family and non-family firms. By and large, these outcomes propose 
that the ''one size fits all'' methodology required by the administrative powers for delegating independent 
directors on corporate sheets may not as a matter of course improves firm execution, particularly for family firms. 
(Gupta and Sharma 2014) considered that Corporate Administration is expected to make a corporate society of 
perception, straightforwardness and openness. It empowers an organization to boost the long haul estimation.  
(Saravia 2013) studied on that firm lifecycle hypothesis the office expenses of free money streams are 
not passing issues but rather are a tireless issue for full grown firms. The study amplifies the hypothesis by 
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proposing that to kill the risk of takeover the controlling gatherings of developing firms logically convey 
antitakeover procurements, and this permits them to overinvest securely and avert conservation. Observational 
results demonstrate that as firms develop free money streams expand, more antitakeover procurements are 
established and negative net present quality activities are attempted. 
(Cohen, Gaynor et al. 2014) concentrated on that regardless of regulations that command that review 
advisory groups must be financially autonomous, the directors might even now impact review council 
individuals through earlier associations with the President from either social ties (e.g., fitting in with the same 
nation club) or expert ties (e.g., having cooperated or served on sheets together).  
H4: There is a relationship between female directors and Firm performance. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Sample Selection 
The current study’s sample comprises of 92 companies listed on KS from years 2009 and 2014 and excluded 
financial firms as they differ in structure, methods and accounting practices from the sample (Barontini and 
Caprio 2006); (Bøhren and Strøm 2010). Data on independent directors, split role of directors, board meetings 
and female directors other corporate governance variables were manually collected from the annual reports of 
sample firms.  
 
3.2 Measurement of Key Variables 
The firm performance was measured by market based measurement of ROA. It is a forward looking 
measurement reflecting the shareholder expectations regarding future performance of the firm, which is based on 
past or current performance (Ganguli and Agrawal 2009); (Shan and McIver 2011); (Bear, Rahman et al. 2010; 
Wahla, Maheshwari et al. 2012; Bruynseels and Cardinaels 2013).  
 
3.3 Regression Models 
Model  
ROA = α0 + γ1*NUMID + γ2*SR + γ3*BRD + γ4*FMD 
Robustness check model 
ROE = α0 + γ1*NUMID + γ2*SR + γ3*BRD + γ4*FMD 
Where, 
α0 = Error term 
NUMID = Number of Independent Directors 
SR = Split Role 
BRD = Board Meeting 
FMD = Female Directors 
ROA = Return on Asset 
ROE= Return on Equity 
 
4. EMPERICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistic 
The table 1 depicts the descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables. The sample size is 552 
firms. The average ROA is 0.0309 with the standard deviation 0.1350. The average number of independent 
directors is 5.1358 and standard deviation is 1.9894. The average split role of the sample size is 0.7210 with 
standard deviation of 0.4489. The average of board meetings is 5.3496 with the standard deviation of 2.2414. 
The average of female directors is 0.8949 with the standard deviation 1.2168. 
 
4.2. Correlation Matrix 
The results show that there is negative relationship between ROA and number of independent directors. On the 
contrary there is positive relationship between ROA and split role. The results of board meeting and female 
directors depict negative relationship with the ROA. 
 
4.3 Regression Results 
The regression results show that there is significant negative affect among number of independent directors, 
board meetings and female directors on return on assets at 5% level of significance because p value is less than 
0.05. The results depict significant positive impact of split role of directors and return on assets. Thus our 
findings support our hypothesis H1, H2, H3 and H4. Our findings are in line with earlier studies. 
Robustness checks 
Robustness checks are performed to evaluate whether our main results change if an alternative performance 
measure is used. We use the return on equity (ROE) as the performance measures in place of ROA in the main 
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tests. The results for ROE are similar to those of ROA. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The paper is an attempt to examine the relationship of corporate governance to firm performance of firms listed 
on KSE. Our results on the composite measure of corporate governance show that overall quality of corporate 
governance has a significantly association with firm performance. Since we required our sample firms to have 
data available for all identified provisions, we dropped almost two-thirds of the firms due to missing data. Thus 
to the extent our final sample is not a perfect representative of the whole population of publicly listed firms on 
KSE. Future studies need to test more data. 
Our findings have implications for policy makers, regulators, managers, investors and researchers in the 
emerging markets of Pakistan. Our evidence on the association between corporate governance factors and firm 
performance should help policy makers and regulators develop new policies to establish a competitive legal and 
regulatory infrastructure to attract foreign capital. New regulations should continue to promote corporate 
governance for the listed firms. In addition, our findings have implications for the managers of public companies. 
Managers and board of directors of listed firms should adopt high standards of corporate governance. The results 
of the study provide evidence to investors in Pakistani firms that corporate governance is related to company-
specific performance and value. Since this study suggests better governed firms perform better, investors should 
be aware of the corporate governance metrics of the firms in Pakistan in which they are considering investment. 
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